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Higher education is becoming the modern day Gestapo. 
Most would agree that faculty members at universities across the coun-
try should not be permitted to make racial, prejudicial, stereotypical, and 
highly offensive comments in the classroom toward individual students or 
groups.  The difficult question is delineating the line between unpopular 
speech that offends members of the student and academic community, and 
unpopular speech that, while offensive, must be tolerated as part of class-
room and university discourse.2 
 
  Associate Dean and Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana Tech Law School. 
 1 Eric Owens, Washington State U. SMACKS DOWN Professors Who Want to CENSOR Political-
ly-Incorrect Language, THE DAILY CALLER (Sept. 1, 2015), 
http://dailycaller.com/2015/09/01/washington-state-u-smacks-down-professors-who-want-to-
censor-politically-incorrect-language/; see also Justin Wm. Moyer, Washington State University 
Class Bans ‘Offensive’ Terms Like Male, Female, Tranny, Illegal Alien, Wash. Post Sept. 2, 
2015, http://tablet.washingtonpost.com/rweb/politics/college-class-bans-offensive-terms-like-
male-female-tranny-illegal-alien/2015/09/02/1ae482a4257a6736a9dcb8b6f3a77875_story.html 
(expanding more on the details of the speech policy). 
 2 The American Association of University Professors’ Statement on Academic Freedom, as well as 
many university policies governing free speech, are riddled with ambiguities that fail to guide 
administrators, faculty, and students. The AAUP statement on academic freedom provides as fol-
lows: 
Teachers are entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication of the results, sub-
ject to the adequate performance of their other academic duties. . . . Teachers are entitled 
to freedom in the classroom in discussing their subject, but they should be careful not to 
introduce into their teaching controversial matter which has no relation to their sub-
ject. . . . College and university teachers are citizens, members of a learned profession, 
and officers of an educational institution. When they speak or write as citizens, they 
should be free from institutional censorship or discipline, but their special position in the 
community imposes special obligations. As scholars and educational officers, they should 
remember that the public may judge their profession and their institution by their utter-
ances. Hence they should at all times be accurate, should exercise appropriate restraint, 
should show respect for the opinions of others, and should make every effort to indicate 
that they are not speaking for the institution.  AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY 
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This essay argues that universities have gone too far in suppressing un-
popular, even distasteful, speech that is accorded the highest degree of First 
Amendment protection and that is vital to facilitating the robust exchange 
of ideas and viewpoints among students and faculty.  As discussed below, 
university administrators have censored faculty members and, in some cas-
es, adopted policies that discourage core political speech, discriminate 
against speech on the basis of its content, and deter faculty and students 
from expressing controversial views. 
In so doing, many universities have manufactured artificial utopias 
based on a philosophy of avoiding, not confronting, unpopular ideas, and of 
pacifying, not empowering, students in the pursuit of knowledge.  In this 
way, some universities have become equivalent to the anxiety-riddled par-
ent who shelters a child from the evils of the world, only to find out years 
later that the child is woefully unprepared for life’s challenges.  The same 
result occurs when universities pamper, coddle, and over-react to the 
whims of every hyper-sensitive student who would rather label a professor 
or fellow student “insensitive” than engage in a constructive dialogue with 
students and faculty who have different opinions.  Students are unprepared 
for the world they are about to enter, and the educational benefits of a di-
verse student body are compromised, if not entirely abandoned.  Put differ-
ently, the fact that universities are “educating the young for citizenship is 
reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individ-
ual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to 
discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.”3 
Nowhere are free speech rights more important than in higher educa-
tion.  As the Supreme Court has recognized, “classroom discussion is live-
lier, more spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting” when 
students have “the greatest possible variety of backgrounds,”4 and where 
knowledge is acquired through “speculation, experiment and creation.”5  In 
Keyishian v. Board of Regents,6 the United States Supreme Court held as 
follows: 
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of 
transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned.  That 
freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not 
 
PROFESSORS, 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure available 
at: http://www.aaup.org/report/1940-statement-principles-academic-freedom-and-tenure. 
  These and other policies provide minimal, if any, guidance to university personnel, and make it 
likely that policies concerning free speech will be largely subjective and, in some case, motivated 
by discrimination against particular viewpoints. 
 3 Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864-65 (1982) 
(quoting West Virginia State Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)). 
 4 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003). 
 5 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (quoting Sweezy v. New Hamp-
shire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957)). 
 6 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
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tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.  The vigilant 
protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the com-
munity of American schools.7 
When Universities over-regulate classroom speech by professors and 
students, they engage in precisely what the First Amendment seeks to pre-
vent, and prohibit precisely what the First Amendment seeks to foster:  a 
heterogeneous classroom environment in which students of all backgrounds 
can express opinions without the fear of reprisal, without the threat of cen-
sure, and without the “pall of orthodoxy” that renders free speech an ab-
stract, rather than concrete, right.8 
The problem with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, and university 
policies governing free speech, is the exclusive focus on whether the facul-
ty member’s speech warrants first amendment protection, and not on 
whether a faculty member or student can actually prove that particular 
speech or expressive conduct, even if protected, resulted in cognizable le-
gal harm.  This essay proposes a framework for evaluating the free speech 
rights in higher education that is analogous, in part, to two prongs under the 
standard for adjudicating sexual harassment jurisprudence under Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act.  Under Title VII, employees are entitled to a work-
place that is free of “discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, [and] insult,”9 
and may recover for sexual harassment where the employee was a member 
of protected class, subject to unwanted sexual harassment based on sex that 
“affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment,”10 and where the 
employer failed to take remedial measures.11  By way of analogy, faculty 
members and students should likewise be entitled to an educational envi-
ronment that is free of discrimination, coercion and intimidation, but the 
law (and university policies) should only provide a remedy where the 
speech:  (1) is subjectively and objectively unwelcome; (2) is offensive to 
an individual of reasonable sensibilities; and (3) creates a hostile educa-
tional environment that is not conducive to the expression of different 
views.12  In conducting this analysis, courts should consider, among other 
things, the following factors: 
 The context in which the speech was made, including its pedagogical value 
and relevance to the subject matter or course; 
 
 7 Id. at 603 (emphasis added)(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 8 Id. 
 9 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). 
 10 Linville v. Sears, Roebuck, and Co., 335 F.3d 822, 823-24 (8th Cir. 2003).  Importantly, students 
would not be required to show that they are members of a protected class, as all students, regard-
less of their background, are entitled to a welcome and stable educational environment. 
 11 See id. 
 12 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998) (listing the factors needed in order 
to sustain an actionable sex discrimination claim). 
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 Whether the speech “unreasonably interferes with a [student’s] work per-
formance,”13 which entails a focus on whether a reasonable person of ordinary 
sensibilities would find the speech offensive and unwelcome; and 
 Whether the speech was targeted at specific students or groups. 
Of course, given the fact that students often do not have the means or 
desire to file legal actions against their universities, this standard would be 
less stringent that that governing Title VII claims.  In addition, it would not 
prevent universities from enforcing “reasonable time, place, and manner 
regulations”14 on certain types of speech.  In doing so, this standard would 
strike a more appropriate chord than many current university policies, 
which err on the side of suppressing, rather than encouraging, protected 
speech.  Indeed, students and faculty members should not be allowed to 
complain about speech that, although personally offensive or distasteful, 
would not be offensive to the reasonable person.15  Furthermore, although a 
university has a duty to protect students from offensive speech that has 
minimal pedagogical educational value, speech policies should not become 
a “general civility code,”16 or promote an educational climate that is based 
largely on the speculative harms that might result from controversial 
speech or, worse, disagreement with a speaker’s viewpoint.  Such an ap-
proach would undermine, rather than encourage, the free flow of ideas, and 
make the classroom more, not less, divorced from the real world. 
Part II discusses troubling developments in higher education that have 
led to the over-policing of speech, and over-reaction to students claiming to 
be “offended” by a faculty member’s speech inside the classroom.  Part III 
argues that courts and universities should adopt a new framework for eval-
uating analogous to Title VII sex discrimination claims when inquiring 
whether a faculty member’s speech warrants legal protection.  Ultimately, 
“the comprehensive authority . . . of school officials” must be exercised 
“consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards,”17 and that should 
require universities to embrace, not shun, all viewpoints, and to encourage, 
not eradicate, speech with which some, or even most, may disagree. 
 
 13 Id. at 787–88. 
 14 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981). 
 15 Of course, there will be instances in which speech that would not be grounds for a cognizable 
claim under this standard would still be considered offensive to a reasonable person.  For exam-
ple, a statement to an Asian person that “You must be good at math,” could certainly be viewed 
as offensive and should be discouraged, but it should not be the basis upon which to fire faculty 
members or label someone “racist.”  See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 
273 (1988) (school officials may restrict some speech on the basis of content if it is “reasonably 
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns”).  A standard analogous to that used in Title VII sex 
discrimination claims can provide a baseline by which university administrators can address free 
speech issues and respond proportionately and fairly to complaints. 
 16 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (internal quotation omitted). 
 17 Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969). 
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II.  INCLUSION THROUGH EXCLUSION:  UNDERMINING THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT AND THWARTING THE FREE EXCHANGE OF IDEAS 
The purpose of obtaining a college or graduate degree is not merely to 
acquire knowledge.  Students must learn to apply that knowledge to real-
world situations and interact with people of diverse backgrounds and be-
liefs.  The over-regulation of speech is entirely inconsistent with this objec-
tive. 
A.  The Core Purpose of Higher Education 
Higher education provides students with to the opportunity to collec-
tively discover truth “out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through 
any kind of authoritative selection,”18 and connects classroom discourse to 
the diverse perspectives students will encounter in the real world.  One 
commentator states as follows: 
Attempts to shield students from words, ideas, and people that might cause 
them emotional discomfort are bad for the students.  They are bad for the 
workplace, which will be mired in unending litigation if student expectations of 
safety are carried forward.  And they are bad for American democracy, which 
is already paralyzed by worsening partisanship.  When the ideas, values, and 
speech of the other side are seen not just as wrong but as willfully aggressive 
toward innocent victims, it is hard to imagine the kind of mutual respect, nego-
tiation, and compromise that are needed to make politics a positive-sum game.  
Rather than trying to protect students from words and ideas that they will inevi-
tably encounter, colleges should do all they can to equip students to thrive in a 
world full of words and ideas that they cannot control.  One of the great truths 
taught by Buddhism (and Stoicism, Hinduism, and many other traditions) is 
that you can never achieve happiness by making the world conform to your de-
sires.  But you can master your desires and habits of thought.  This, of course, 
is the goal of cognitive behavioral therapy.  With this in mind, here are some 
steps that might help reverse the tide of bad thinking on campus.19 
In Regents of University of California v. Bakke,20 the Court noted that 
“law school, the proving ground for legal learning and practice, cannot be 
effective in isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the 
law interacts,”  and “removed from the interplay of ideas and the exchange 
of views with which the law is concerned.”21  Concerning medical school, 
the Court noted that “[p]hysicians serve a heterogeneous population,” and 
“[a]n otherwise qualified medical student with a particular background—
 
 18 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 
(S.D.N.Y. 1943)). 
 19 Greg Lukianoff & Jonathan Haidt, The Coddling of the American Mind, THE ATLANTIC, Sept. 
2015, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/09/the-coddling-of-the-
american-mind/399356/. 
 20 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 21 Id. at 314 (internal citation omitted). 
6 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 18 
whether it be ethnic, geographic, culturally advantaged or disadvantaged—
may bring . . . ideas that enrich the training of its student body and better 
equip its graduates to render with understanding their vital service to hu-
manity.”22  Simply put, if the inclusion of controversial topics and ex-
change of controversial beliefs is prohibited, no university can make the 
claim that it is inclusive. 
In recent years, however, Universities have adopted policies that result 
in the suppression of speech on matters of political and social importance, 
and that reflect the diversity of the classroom environment.  The stated rea-
son for such policies—to foster an inclusive educational environment and 
eliminate intolerant, divisive, and offensive speech—is the height of hypoc-
risy.  These policies discourage faculty members from expressing unpopu-
lar views, inhibit rigorous classroom discussion on matters of social im-
portance, and over-react to the hyper-sensitivities of students who would 
rather avoid, than confront, topics and opinions they find distasteful.  In so 
doing, universities are achieving an artificial atmosphere of “inclusion” 
through exclusion, undermining free speech values, and undercutting the 
education values of diversity. 
B. Over-Sensitizing the Academic Environment:  Misguided Attempts to 
Suppress Speech 
1. Discouraging “Microaggressions” 
Microagressions, which are facially innocuous statements that purport-
edly contain insensitive underlying messages, are the newest rave in higher 
education’s mission to pacify even the most sensitive minds.  For example, 
the University of California at Berkeley recently issued a memorandum to 
professors discouraging the used of what it calls “microagrressions.”  For 
example, Berkeley has discouraged faculty from making statements such 
as: 
 “Men and women have equal opportunities for achievement.” 
 “I believe the most qualified person should get the job.” 
 “America is a melting pot.” 
 “Why are you so quiet?”23 
 
 22 Id. 
 23 Recognizing Microagressions and the Messages They Send, available at 
http://www.ucop.edu/academic-personnel-
programs/_files/seminars/Tool_Recognizing_Microaggressions.pdf; see also Robby Soave, The 
University of California’s Insane Speech Police, THE DAILY BEAST, June 22, 2015, available at  
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/06/22/the-university-of-california-s-insane-speech-
police.html (reporting on the adverse effects that the UC Berkeley memorandum might have on 
free speech). 
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Admittedly, some speech that technically classifies as a “microagres-
sion” is insensitive and has questionable pedagogical value.  The phrase 
“You are a credit to your race,” can be understood by a reasonable person 
to imply that the speaker views that race as inferior.  Statements like these 
have no pedagogical value and should be actively discouraged in the educa-
tional setting.  Conversely, a statement such as “I think the most qualified 
person should get the job” may reflect a merit-based philosophy and possi-
bly opposition to affirmative action, but it certainly does not suggest ani-
mus or prejudice toward a racial or ethnic group.  If anything, this state-
ment suggests that the speaker does not support the use of affirmative 
action in higher education.  This may spark vehement disagreement, but it 
certainly does not convey intolerance or create a hostile educational envi-
ronment.  When universities target this speech, regardless of their good in-
tentions, the fear of reprisal for voicing such opinions is likely to have a 
chilling effect on free speech. 
2. Bans on Politically-Incorrect Speech by Faculty and Students 
Some faculty members at Washington State University recently banned 
students from using words like “[c]olored people,” and “[t]ranny” in the 
classroom, on the grounds that these words can be offensive to many stu-
dents [and] create an uncomfortable, if not hostile, classroom environment, 
and respective dialogue.24 
Furthermore, one professor at Washington State warned white students 
that, “to do well in this class”25 and to reflect their “grasp of history and so-
cial relations” white students should defer “to the experiences of people of 
color.”26  Yet another professor teaching a feminism course at Washington 
State stated in her syllabus that students risked “failure for the semester”27 
if they referred to men and women by the term “male” or “female.”28  For-
tunately, Washington State University’s President intervened to warn facul-
ty that such conduct was not consistent with fostering “[o]pen dialogue, 
vigorous debate and the free exchange of ideas, as well as the language 
 
 24 College Class Bans “Offensive” Words, THE J. GAZETTE (September 3, 2015), 
http://www.journalgazette.net/news/us/College-class-bans—offensive—words-8574432. (brack-
ets added). 
 25 Eric Owens, Washington State U. Smacks Down Professors Who Want to Censor Politically-
Incorrect Language, DAILY CALLER (Sept. 1, 2015), 
http://dailycaller.com/2015/09/01/washington-state-u-smacks-down-professors-who-want-to-
censor-politically-incorrect-language/. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
8 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 18 
used to convey these ideas,”29 all of which “are at the core of who we are as 
a higher education institution.”30 
Of course some of the above statements are undoubtedly offensive.  
However, a blanket ban on statements that would typically be regarded as 
offensive ignores the fact that some offensive statements have pedagogical 
value and therefore will not create an unwelcome and hostile classroom en-
vironment.  When faced with complaints about such speech, universities 
should consider the purpose for which these words were uttered, such as 
where a faculty member or student is quoting from a book or recalling a 
traumatic incident, and assess their relevance to the course’s subject matter. 
3.  Bans on “Divisive” Speech 
Moreover, some universities actively ban speech that strives to spark 
public debate on matters of public interest.  The University of Iowa recent-
ly removed a seven-foot statute depicting a Ku Klux Klan robe covered 
with articles concerning racial tensions over the last century.31  The artwork 
was intended to remind students of the horrors of racism, and to encourage 
progressive dialogue on race relations.32  Notwithstanding, the University 
of Iowa’s President branded the artist a racist, and made the following 
statement: 
The University of Iowa is a diverse community with no tolerance for racism, 
and the artwork that was briefly displayed on the Pentacrest this morning was 
deeply offensive to members of our community . . . .  The University of Iowa 
considers all forms of racism abhorrent and is deeply committed to the princi-
ples of inclusion and acceptance.  There is no room for divisive, insensitive, 
and intolerant displays on this campus.33 
The last sentence highlights everything that is wrong with universities 
that seek inclusion through the exclusion of speech to which the First 
Amendment affords the highest protection.  Furthermore, the university had 
the audacity to label the artist a racist, thereby smearing his character and 
ignoring the purpose of the artwork.  In fact, it is the university officials, 
not the artist, who are the poster children for division, insensitivity, and in-
tolerance. 
 
 29 Id. 
 30 Owens, supra note 25. 
 31 Greg Lukianoff, Free Speech on Campus:  The 10 Worst Offenders of 2014, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/greg-lukianoff/10-worst-for-free-
speech_b_6769564.html. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Email from Thomas R. Rocklin, Vice President for Student Life, U. of Iowa, to Students, Faculty 
and Staff (Dec. 5, 2014, 14:03), available at https://www.thefire.org/email-thomas-r-rocklin-iu-
campus-community/. 
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4. Bans on Innocuous Speech 
In addition, the University of California-Fullerton flagrantly disregard-
ed First Amendment freedoms when it accused a sorority of engaging in 
“[d]isorderly, lewd, indecent, or obscene conduct”34 for holding an event 
titled “Taco Tuesday,”35 in which members of the sorority wore sombreros 
and Mexican clothing.36  The university forced the sorority to attend man-
datory workshops on “cultural competencies and diversity,”37 even though 
nothing in the record remotely suggested that the sorority members were 
motivated by prejudice or intolerance.  Similarly, Modesto Junior College 
administrators prohibited a student from distributing copies of the United 
States Constitution because the student was not standing within the col-
lege’s designated “free speech zone,”38 which consists of two relatively 
small concrete areas on the college’s 225-acre campus.39  When a professor 
at the college voiced support for the student, the college retaliated with a 
negative job evaluation and restricted his course load.40 
The obvious problem with banning facially innocuous speech, as well 
as speech some might consider divisive, is that conclusions regarding the 
quality and character of the speech are inescapably subjective.  Given this 
fact, universities should adopt policies that focus on the objective reasona-
bleness of the speech, and not discourage or prohibit speech that some stu-
dents might conceivably find offensive.  This approach would recognize 
that there will be moments in the classroom, as there will be in the real 
world, where individuals will find speech distasteful.  But it is precisely 
this type of speech that permits students to learn from “the greatest possible 
variety of backgrounds,”41 and to find enlightenment through “speculation, 
experiment and creation.”42 
5. Policies that Inhibit Protected Speech 
Some universities have adopted policies that inhibit the free exchange 
of ideas, including speech outside of the classroom.  The University of 
Kansas, for example, recently adopted a policy governing the faculty mem-
 
 34 Lukianoff, supra note 31. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Greg Lukianoff, Free Speech on Campus: The 10 Worst Offenders of 2014, (May 2, 2015), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/greg-lukianoff/10-worst-for-free-speech_b_6769564.html. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Quarantining the Constitution:  The Fight for Free Speech on a California Campus, 
THEFIREORG (June 25, 2014) (published on YouTube), available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yBMafvA-TFU. 
 40 See Lukianoff, supra note 31 (discussing the consequences for Professor Holly). 
 41 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330. 
 42 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (quoting Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263). 
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bers’ use of social media.  The policy contains a paragraph prohibiting the 
following speech that: 
[I]mpairs discipline by superiors or harmony among co-workers, has a detri-
mental impact on close working relationships for which personal loyalty and 
confidence are necessary, impedes the performance of the speaker’s official du-
ties, interferes with the regular operation of the university, or otherwise ad-
versely affects the university’s ability to efficiently provide services.43 
The policy also provides that “the chief executive officer shall balance 
the interest of the university in promoting the efficiency of the public ser-
vices it performs through its employees against the employee’s right as a 
citizen to speak on matters of public concern.”44 
6. Trigger Warnings 
Relatedly, some universities have embraced the use of “trigger warn-
ings,” which require professors to advise students in advance of sensitive 
subject matter that will be discussed in class.45  Along with blanket bans on 
specific words, these policies create an environment in which professors 
and students must carefully watch their words for fear that the style or con-
tent of their utterances might “offend” someone, transgress a university 
policy, or draw condemnation from faculty colleagues. 
Although trigger warnings do not, on their face, appear to threaten free 
speech rights, the philosophy underlying them is one of avoidance in which 
students are permitted to opt out of classes where sensitive subjects are 
taught.  One commentator states as follows: 
Some students have called for warnings that Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall 
Apart describes racial violence and that F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The Great Gats-
by portrays misogyny and physical abuse, so that students who have been pre-
viously victimized by racism or domestic violence can choose to avoid these 
works, which they believe might “trigger” a recurrence of past trauma.46 
Few would question the enduring and irreparable trauma that can result 
from being victimized by racism and domestic violence.  Thus, a trigger 
warning can be a sensible tool by which to notify students in advance of 
sensitive or potentially divisive topics.  On the other hand, exempting stu-
dents from specific classes or assignments can inhibit a constructive class-
room dialogue about such topics, make it impossible for students from di-
verse backgrounds to discuss difficult issues openly, and prevent students 
 
 43 See Kansas Board of Regents, Proposed Revision to Board Policy, (Dec. 18-19, 2013) (emphasis 
added), available at 
http://worldonline.media.clients.ellingtoncms.com/news/documents/2013/12/18/discussion_agen
da_socialmediapolicy.pdf. 
 44 Id. 
 45 See Lukianoff & Haidt, supra note 19. 
 46 Id. 
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from challenging the conscious or subconscious beliefs that they may har-
bor.  Of course, professors must use discretion in every situation, particu-
larly where a trauma is recent or the student is clearly unable to participate 
meaningfully in a discussion.  In most situations, however, trigger warnings 
do not empower students.  They allow them to retreat into the same false 
utopia that aggressive regulations of faculty speech create. 
III.  A BETTER FRAMEWORK FOR RESOLVING FIRST AMENDMENT 
DISPUTES IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
Admittedly, First Amendment protections do not apply equally in all 
contexts.  Free speech rights vary depending on the context within which 
speech is uttered, and in some cases based on the content of the speech.47  
Students have diminished free speech rights in public high schools to en-
sure a stable learning environment for all students.  Likewise, universities 
may–and should–regulate offensive, derogatory, prejudicial or distasteful 
speech that would otherwise be protected by the First Amendment, but that 
reflects prejudice toward individual students or groups. 
In Healy v. James,48 the Supreme Court stated: 
[T]he precedents of this Court leave no room for the view that, because of the 
acknowledged need for order, First Amendment protections should apply with 
less force on college campuses than in the community at large.  Quite to the 
contrary, ‘(t)he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more 
vital than in the community of American schools.’  The college classroom with 
its surrounding environs is peculiarly the “marketplace of ideas,” and we break 
no new constitutional ground in reaffirming this Nation’s dedication to safe-
guarding academic freedom.49 
It is disturbing that the wholesale suppression of speech to which the First 
Amendment affords the highest constitutional protection is happening at 
places like California-Berkeley, Washington State, the University of Iowa, 
and the University of California-Fullerton.  And these examples are not 
anomalies.  The new norm in higher education is to suppress speech on the 
basis of its content while labeling faculty members and students “divisive,” 
“insensitive,” or “intolerant.”  That should change  now.  The Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act as ap-
plied to claims of sexual harassment provides a principled framework for 
resolving the free speech disputes in higher education, ironically, to focus 
less on the First Amendment and more on the effect of the speech on the 
audience.  This encompasses an analysis of whether the speech at issue 
 
 47 See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist., 484 U.S. at 274 (noting that schools can regulate some speech 
on the basis of content if it is “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns”). 
 48 408 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1972) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960), Keyishian, 
385 U.S. at 603 and Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 249-50 (plurality opinion)). 
 49 Healy, 408 U.S. at 180-81. 
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was:  (a) objectively unwelcome; (2) offensive to an individual of ordinary 
sensibilities; and (3) likely to create a hostile educational environment. 
A.  Whether the Speech was Objectively Unwelcome 
In the context of sexual harassment claims under Title VII, the Court 
has held that “not all workplace conduct that may be described as ‘harass-
ment’ is, in fact, sexual harassment.”50  Furthermore, courts have “never 
held that workplace harassment, even harassment between men and wom-
en, is automatically discrimination because of sex merely because the 
words used have sexual content or connotations.”51  In fact, a “recurring 
point . . . is that ‘simple teasing,’ offhand comments, and isolated incidents 
(unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the 
‘terms and conditions of employment.’”52  Furthermore, “not all profane 
or sexual language or conduct will constitute discrimination in the terms 
and conditions of employment.”53  Rather, the harassment must be “suffi-
ciently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] em-
ployment and create an abusive working environment.’”54 
A similar principle should apply when assessing if speech at issue in the 
university context is objectively unreasonable.  Not all speech that could 
conceivably be deemed “offensive” should be censored, and not all stu-
dents who complain about a faculty member’s speech should be entitled to 
a remedy, legal or otherwise.  Instead, courts should consider, among other 
things, the context within which the speech was made, including its peda-
gogical value and relevance to the subject matter.  To illustrate, in Hardy v. 
Jefferson Community College,55 the words “bitch,” “faggot,” and “nigger” 
were used in a lecture discussing language and social constructivism, and 
how “race, gender, and power conflicts in our society.”56  After one student 
complained, the college refused to allow the professor to teach the course.57  
The Sixth Circuit found in favor of the professor, holding that 
“[r]easonable school officials should have known that such speech, when it 
is germane to the classroom subject matter and advances an academic mes-
sage, is protected by the First Amendment.”58  The Sixth Circuit’s holding 
correctly recognized that if protected speech serves a valid and reasonable 
 
 50 Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67. 
 51 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv’s, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998). 
 52 Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1245 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal citation omitted). 
 53 Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 808 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 54 Id. (quoting Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1245 (11th Cir. 1999)). 
 55 260 F.3d 674 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 56 Id. at 679. 
 57 Id. at 683. 
 58 Id.  
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pedagogical purpose in light of a course’s subject matter, there is no basis 
upon which to prohibit its expression. 
This is not to say that universities cannot regulate other speech that the 
Court has deemed unworthy of First Amendment protection, such as ob-
scenity,59 or in appropriate instances restrict highly offensive speech that 
would otherwise be protected if not made in a classroom or university con-
text.  However, discouraging faculty members from saying, “I think the 
most qualified person should get the job,” prohibiting students from using 
the words “male” or “female,” or  penalizing a sorority for “Taco Tuesday” 
is objectively unreasonable.  Doing so does not promote inclusion and cer-
tainly does not facilitate the uninhibited exchange of ideas.  Rather, it casts 
a palpable chill over university communities by subtly coercing individuals 
into silence based on the fear that their expressive conduct, regardless of 
how innocent, sincere, or protected, can result in severe sanctions. 
B. Whether the Speech Would Be Offensive to an Individual of Ordinary 
Sensibilities 
In the Title VII context, courts have routinely held that the standard for 
assessing whether “harassing conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive 
to alter an employee’s terms or conditions of employment includes a sub-
jective and an objective component.”60  In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,61 
the Supreme Court stated that “the objective severity of harassment should 
be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s po-
sition, considering ‘all the circumstances,’”62 including a “careful consider-
ation of the social context in which particular behavior occurs and is expe-
rienced by its target.”63  By way of analogy, the tort of intentional infliction 
of emotional distress requires a plaintiff to demonstrate “the conduct. . .[is] 
‘so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all 
possible bounds of decency, and be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intol-
erable in a civilized community.’”64  Indeed, the fact that the “level of atro-
ciousness to which [the behavior] must [rise] is quite high,”65 reflects the 
proposition, as evident with the objective reasonableness requirement, that 
 
 59 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18-20 (1973) (holding that obscenity is not protected 
by the First Amendment). 
 60 Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1246 (citing Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993)). 
 61 510 U.S. 17 (1993). 
 62 Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1246 (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81). 
 63 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81. 
 64 Reynolds v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, 454 F.3d 868, 873 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Harris v. Jeffer-
son Partners, L.P., 653 N.W.2d 496, 500 (S.D. 2002) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965)). 
 65 Skidmore v. Precision Printing And Packaging. Inc., 188 F.3d 606, 613 (5th Cir. 1999) (altera-
tions in original) (quoting Franklin v. Enserch, Inc., 961 S.W.2d 704, 710 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 
1998)). 
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not all harms or sensitivities should entitle individuals to a legal remedy or 
motivate universities to suppress speech. 
Courts—and higher education–should embrace this principle in the ac-
ademic environment.  To promote a climate where controversial ideas are 
confronted, not avoided, and unpopular speech is welcomed, not shunned, 
universities must accept that there will be opinions, statements, and other 
forms of expressive activity that they find subjectively offensive.  Thus, in 
order to facilitate meaningful and realistic classroom dialogue, speech or 
expressive conduct should not be regulated unless it is objectively offensive 
to individuals of average sensibilities.  For example, it may be uncomforta-
ble to discuss rape in a criminal justice course, and it may be disturbing to 
see images of the Ku Klux Klan in a multiculturalism course.  That fact 
alone, of course, does not make those images less real or history less accu-
rate.  Furthermore, the point of discussing rape or showing images of the 
Ku Klux Klan is not to cause distress, but to spark dialogue  so that stu-
dents may learn through “speculation, experiment and creation”66 and 
“thrive in a world full of words and ideas that they cannot control.”67 
C.  Whether the Speech Creates a Hostile Educational Environment 
In the Title VII context, when examining if an employer’s conduct cre-
ated a “hostile work environment,” courts consider “the frequency of the 
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or 
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably in-
terferes with an employee’s work performance.”68  Moreover, the conduct 
“must be both objectively offensive, meaning that a reasonable person 
would find it hostile and abusive, and subjectively offensive, meaning that 
the victim perceived it to be so.”69 
A similar standard should apply to determine if a student or faculty 
member’s expressions create a hostile educational environment.  Of course 
this would not mean that a single statement, if sufficiently severe, could not 
be the basis for a university sanction or legal sanction.  In making this de-
termination, courts should consider, among other things, whether the 
speech is targeted at specific individuals or groups, has a tendency to ex-
plicitly or implicitly discourage particular viewpoints, is relevant to the 
 
 66 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (quoting Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result) 
(internal quotation omitted). 
 67 THE ATLANTIC, supra note 19, available at: 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/09/the-coddling-of-the-american-
mind/399356/. 
 68 Harris, 510 U.S. at 23 (1993). 
 69 Harvill v. Westward Commc’ns, 433 F.3d 428, 434 (5th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added) (citing 
Shepherd v. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, 168 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir.1999)) (citing Harris, 510 
U.S. at 21-22). 
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subject matter being discussed, and is delivered in a professional manner.  
The Table below provides a few examples of the types of offensive speech 
that courts would likely permit and prohibit under this standard.70 
 
STANDARD PERMITTED SPEECH PROHIBITED 
SPEECH 
The speech at issue 
must be subjectively 
and objectively 
unwelcome, offensive 
to a person of 
reasonable 
sensibilities, and 
create a hostile 
educational 
environment 
“I think gay 
marriage is a sin” 
“Homosexuals are 
evil” 
“God hates fags” 
 “I think affirmative 




because they are 
inferior human beings.” 
 “Can we just call 
St. Patrick’s day the 
white people’s 
kwanzaa that it is.”71 
“We should lynch 
all white people.” 
 “White people have 
benefited from a long 
history of 
discrimination and 
need a history lesson in 
diversity.” 
“All white people 




backgrounds are less 




backgrounds are stupid 
rednecks.” 
 “I think some 
women who are raped 
send a message that 
they want to have sex.” 
“If a woman asks 
for it, she gets what she 
deserves.” 
 
 70 The statements in the “permitted” speech column should not be interpreted to suggest the au-
thor’s approval of them.  
71
    Joan Venocci, “BU Professor Teaches a Lesson in Offensive Speech,” (July 7, 2015), available at:          
https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2015/07/06/less-offensive-
speech/VzTnGVA4XCNRXFZDXJgXrN/story.html.  
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 Constructively 





like” on social media72 
 
CONCLUSION 
To obtain a meaningful educational experience and achieve the benefits 
of a diverse student body, students should confront beliefs they find abhor-
rent and discuss topics that bring discomfort.  As it stands now, universities 
are transforming classrooms and campuses into sanctuaries for the over-
sensitive and shelters for the easily-offended.  In so doing, higher education 
is embracing a new, and bizarre, form of homogeneity that subtly coerces 
faculty members and students into restricting, not expressing, their views, 
and creating a climate that favors less, not more, expressive conduct.  This 
approach undermines First Amendment values and further divorces higher 
education from the real world. 
The purpose of attending college or graduate school is not merely to 
acquire knowledge or develop expertise in a chosen field.  Students must 
learn how to interact with people, how to cope with distasteful behavior, 
and how to learn and respond to adversity.  When universities avoid rather 
than acknowledge the world in which we live, they implicitly cultivate a 
mindset that views diversity as less, not more, desirable, and that shuns, ra-
ther than embraces, a true marketplace of ideas where all viewpoints are 
welcomed.  In a society that values democracy, autonomy, and individuali-
ty, nothing is more poisonous or antithetical to the pursuit of knowledge. 
 
72
 See, e.g., Munroe v. Central Bucks School Dist., No. 14-3509, 2015 WL 5167011 at *2-3 (September 
4, 2015) (upholding the dismissal of a teacher who made harsh comments about her students on a social 
media website). 
